香港奇案

What happens when two different pieces of legislation contradict each other? In common law, one could apply the principle of "implied repeal", where the subsequent legislation would be considered to have repealed the earlier one. But the Basic Law has not undergone amendments since its promulgation in 1990, so this does not apply. Another common way to resolve apparent contradictions is to consider that the more general provision be qualified by the more specific one. Yet in cases where fundamental rights are at issue, courts may instead adopt a " generous interpretation ", restricting the scope of those provisions that appear to restrict fundamental rights. Indeed, this was the approach laid out by the Court of Final Appeal in 1999 in Ng Ka Ling : The courts should give a generous interpretation to the provisions in Chapter III that contain these constitutional guarantees in order to give to Hong Kong residents the full measure of fundamental rights and freedoms so...

 睇睇下無聊案例發現咗樣勁好笑嘅嘢。 2004~05 年，高等法院暫委法官馮驊處理周時彬案，後來被終審法院批評佢多處犯錯，一來冇好好處理《火器及彈藥條例》24條嘅推定問題，二來過份依賴原審裁判官對案情嘅事實判斷，忘記咗高院處理 "appeal by way of rehearing" 係有責任重新確認下級法院嘅案情嘅判斷是否合理。一句講晒就係「揸流灘」： "Deputy Judge Fung may not have appreciated that his jurisdiction was “at large” and that, while he had to bear in mind that he did not enjoy the advantage of having received the evidence at first-hand, he was entitled, indeed bound, to come to his own conclusion about the appellant’s knowledge of the existence of the gun and cartridge in his bag when he presented it for security X-ray screening. This Court must now determine that question for itself. The answer is clear." 好喇。事隔 10 年，高等法院馮驊法官處理高級督察劉承聰幫女友「驅鬼」案嘅上訴，案件最後亦都去咗終審法院。終審法院講乜呢？ "Upon appeal Fung J took the approach that the questions of fact were for the trial court to decide and that “unless the findings of fact are irrational, the appellate court will not interfere.” With respect, the judge appears not to have appreciated that ...

 利申：標題黨 tl;dr： - 某國律師接 job 打官司 - 某國外交部話呢位律師接官司係唯利是圖、違背良心 - 某國律師承受巨大壓力，最後被徹換 (... 某國係 英國 ，唔係 中國 ，咪搞錯。) 818 維園非法集結案未開始審就已經爆出大粒咁大單花生。 案件牽涉多位「老泛民」人物，包括黎智英、李柱銘、李卓人、何俊仁等等。香港政府聘請英國御用大狀 David Perry 代表控方。據報[1]，英國政界普遍質疑 Perry 接官司有違道德。英國外相出聲[2]話 Perry 本身冇必要接官司，而家俾人覺得佢「唯利是圖 (mercenary)」。 既然外交部都已經出咗聲，唔通真係等俾人告 treason 先肯收手？Perry 唯有同香港政府講，#功成不必在我。[3] 香港律政司另聘律師[4]。 其實 97 後香港雖然唔再係大英帝國一部份，但香港仍然係普通法地區，政府都不時聘請英國大狀作顧問同打官司。例如早前「暗角七警案」政府都聘用英國御用大狀，所以今次 818 非法集結案搵英國律師都可以話只係「例行公事」。而 Perry 本身都喺多單案件[5]次代表香港政府，包括許仕仁案、陳振聰案等等。大狀受制於 "cab rank rule"，即係好似的士站嘅的士咁，唔可以拒絕唔接case，所以理論上 Perry 係冇得話唔接呢單案嘅。[6] 咁點解 Perry 今次出事呢？ 咪就係「 政治敏感度不足 」囉。《國安法》實施之後，香港特別行政區已經唔係任由外國勢力活動嘅地方。《國安法》除咗用嚟對付「港獨」分子，更加係禁絕外國人員喺香港進行任何對中國不利嘅活動。另外，本身同英國 friend 過夾 band 嘅香港政府，而家要公務員宣誓效忠 中華人民共和國 香港特別行政區。喺外國政權眼中，今時今日嘅香港，已經係等同中國一樣嘅對峙政權。喺咁嘅背景之下，英國嘅御用律師幫香港政府去控告一啲英國公民，已經有種「叛國」意味[7]。 英國律師私人業務變成「外交」問題，要由外交部出手干涉，講到底都係國家利益。喺國家利益之下，法治大國都會俾政治壓力叫律師唔好接官司，你又點可以隨便話 #法治已死[8] 呢？ 另一邊廂，據聞英國已經激烈辯論緊究竟仲派唔派退休法官當香港終審法院非常任法官。David Perry 事件可能係英國政府呢件事嘅一種啟示。 ---- [1] https://w...

KWOK CHEUK KIN (and another) v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS etc [2021] HKCA 54 上訴庭就「丁權」司法覆核案判決。政府勝訴。 「丁權」案加上「禁止蒙面規例」覆核案，上訴庭短短一年內命名咗兩個解讀《基本法》嘅法律原則： "theme of continuity"[0] - 97 前合憲嘅嘢，97 後最好都係咪亂咁判違憲 "coherence principle" - 睇基本法條文唔可以單單指住一條就話違憲，要睇埋其他條文，嘗試理解基本法整體嘅目的，然後再作判斷 (就算某啲法例明明歧視，違反 ICCPR，都需要睇返其他條文嘅背景) 你話呢啲原則係「新」呢？你可以話係，因為以前根本冇呢啲 terms；你可以話唔係，因為起碼佢搵到先例[1]。不過實際上呢，近一年嘅案例標示風向開始改變，法庭似乎受到一定壓力，要減低司法覆核對政府施政嘅干擾，因而強調某啲以前冇咁受注視嘅原則。就算「丁權」只限男性，表面上違反「自由平等普世價值」(eg. ICCPR) 都一樣冇問題。 我諗香港(某些?)法官曾經都有種偉大理想，就係香港可以行西方民主國家路線，將《基本法》當作「憲法」[2]，法官以條文為憑藉，用「開明」角度演繹，重點保障人權自由，慢慢建立一套香港獨有嘅人權法體制。我諗去到 W 案，佢哋都仲係嘗試緊做呢個工作。 今時梗係唔同往日，人大法工委一出聲，上訴庭就搬出 "theme of continuity" （見上）；望住丁權疑似表面上違反《香港人權法案條例》同《基本法》39 條，上訴庭就命名 "coherence principle"，話雖然係歧視，但《基本法》話 OK 就 OK，你睇下呢條同呢條，明明寫住新界地權不變，你唔可以淨係死捉住 39 條嚟拗架！ 《基本法》嘅演繹最基本原則係 "purposive approach"。如果上訴庭呢個判決係 "purposive approach" 兼夾 "coherence principle" 底下嘅正確解讀，咁《基本法》喺呢單案件嘅 "purpose" 係咩呢？唔係保障人權自由 [3]，而係歷史現實嘅一種宣示。法庭唔需要劃蛇添足...