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高等法院法官揸流灘?

 睇睇下無聊案例發現咗樣勁好笑嘅嘢。

2004~05 年,高等法院暫委法官馮驊處理周時彬案,後來被終審法院批評佢多處犯錯,一來冇好好處理《火器及彈藥條例》24條嘅推定問題,二來過份依賴原審裁判官對案情嘅事實判斷,忘記咗高院處理 "appeal by way of rehearing" 係有責任重新確認下級法院嘅案情嘅判斷是否合理。一句講晒就係「揸流灘」:

"Deputy Judge Fung may not have appreciated that his jurisdiction was “at large” and that, while he had to bear in mind that he did not enjoy the advantage of having received the evidence at first-hand, he was entitled, indeed bound, to come to his own conclusion about the appellant’s knowledge of the existence of the gun and cartridge in his bag when he presented it for security X-ray screening. This Court must now determine that question for itself. The answer is clear."

好喇。事隔 10 年,高等法院馮驊法官處理高級督察劉承聰幫女友「驅鬼」案嘅上訴,案件最後亦都去咗終審法院。終審法院講乜呢?

"Upon appeal Fung J took the approach that the questions of fact were for the trial court to decide and that “unless the findings of fact are irrational, the appellate court will not interfere.” With respect, the judge appears not to have appreciated that the appeal was by way of rehearing.[16] But even if it had been an appeal in the strict or narrow sense, an appellate judge is not relieved of an analytical function, to examine whether the reasoning of the court below is flawed and, if so, whether the flaws are material."

一句講晒,又係「揸流灘」。你估下 "[16]" 嗰個注腳係引用咩案例呢?正正係引用返上面嘅周時彬案 :0) #人類總是...


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