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丁權覆核案 - 上訴庭真誠擁護《基本法》，丁權性別歧視仍然合法

KWOK CHEUK KIN (and another) v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS etc [2021] HKCA 54

上訴庭就「丁權」司法覆核案判決。政府勝訴。

「丁權」案加上「禁止蒙面規例」覆核案，上訴庭短短一年內命名咗兩個解讀《基本法》嘅法律原則：
  • "theme of continuity"[0] - 97 前合憲嘅嘢，97 後最好都係咪亂咁判違憲
  • "coherence principle" - 睇基本法條文唔可以單單指住一條就話違憲，要睇埋其他條文，嘗試理解基本法整體嘅目的，然後再作判斷 (就算某啲法例明明歧視，違反 ICCPR，都需要睇返其他條文嘅背景)
你話呢啲原則係「新」呢？你可以話係，因為以前根本冇呢啲 terms；你可以話唔係，因為起碼佢搵到先例[1]。不過實際上呢，近一年嘅案例標示風向開始改變，法庭似乎受到一定壓力，要減低司法覆核對政府施政嘅干擾，因而強調某啲以前冇咁受注視嘅原則。就算「丁權」只限男性，表面上違反「自由平等普世價值」(eg. ICCPR) 都一樣冇問題。

我諗香港(某些?)法官曾經都有種偉大理想，就係香港可以行西方民主國家路線，將《基本法》當作「憲法」[2]，法官以條文為憑藉，用「開明」角度演繹，重點保障人權自由，慢慢建立一套香港獨有嘅人權法體制。我諗去到 W 案，佢哋都仲係嘗試緊做呢個工作。

今時梗係唔同往日，人大法工委一出聲，上訴庭就搬出 "theme of continuity" （見上）；望住丁權疑似表面上違反《香港人權法案條例》同《基本法》39 條，上訴庭就命名 "coherence principle"，話雖然係歧視，但《基本法》話 OK 就 OK，你睇下呢條同呢條，明明寫住新界地權不變，你唔可以淨係死捉住 39 條嚟拗架！

《基本法》嘅演繹最基本原則係 "purposive approach"。如果上訴庭呢個判決係 "purposive approach" 兼夾 "coherence principle" 底下嘅正確解讀，咁《基本法》喺呢單案件嘅 "purpose" 係咩呢？唔係保障人權自由 [3]，而係歷史現實嘅一種宣示。法庭唔需要劃蛇添足諗點樣擴充人權自由，只需因循故習，用歷史脈絡將法律合理化。若要取捨，不妨捨棄「自由平等普世價值」，跟返政府論調辦事就夠。例如話，廿幾年前中英兩國政府都曾經講過[4]性別平等公約唔包丁權，香港嘅地區法庭豈敢迕逆？

嗱，我唔係話呢樣一定係啱或錯，起碼喺現時政治環境下呢個係法庭正常嘅表現嚟。我只不過係幫上訴庭畫返條腸出嚟。話晒剛卸任嘅終審法院首席法官馬道立話，大家要睇判詞，睇下法官*點解*咁判，唔好因為唔滿意結論就屌嘛。

咁我唯有寫幾句咁囉。

呢單案咁樣判決，感覺上都真係幾唔顧及香港法庭喺國際上嘅面子。 Which is totally fine, 反正現實政治都已經一早搞成咁。

---

[0] 嚴格嚟講呢個 term 係上年「禁止蒙面規例」覆核案命名嘅，不過同一班法官短期內發明兩個新 term 去解讀《基本法》條文，值得擺埋一齊講。

[1] 至於嗰啲先例係咪咁理解就另一回事。尤其 "theme of continuity" 竟然引用 Ma Wai Kwan 案。Ma Wai Kwan 案基本上係主權移交嘅指定娛樂節目嚟，純粹搵條茂利整個先例出嚟話1997年之前嘅法律同案例仍然適用，本身冇諗住用嚟叫人唔好質疑 97 前嘅法律係咪合憲。我只能夠慨嘆一句：果然是老朋友給人大常委的面子，有黨同國家嘅加持，法官都變得創意無限！

[2] 即係垃圾通識科話「憲法係保障人權自由」嗰種「憲法」

[3] What we all claimed and suspected for a long time, just that now it is proclaimed by the Court of Appeal

[4] 似乎係兩國政府就 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 所提出嘅保留事項。Google 大神唔知喺邊度搵到疑似原文。我睇完之後覺得，正常嚟講只能夠說明兩件事： #1 政府冇打算將 CEDAW 應用於丁權方面嘅政策， #2 (中英兩國)政府唔認為丁權政策需要改變。 而上訴庭判決中引用呢個事項，基本上係將某一法律文件(基本法)嘅演繹，交予前宗主國嘅行政部門對另一份國際公約(CEDAW)嘅政策判斷。新時代嘅所謂「司法獨立」竟淪落至此。老老實實，我真係覺得呢樣嘢唔提仲好過提。

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