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外交部出聲!黎智英案律師被辭退

 利申:標題黨

tl;dr:

- 某國律師接 job 打官司
- 某國外交部話呢位律師接官司係唯利是圖、違背良心
- 某國律師承受巨大壓力,最後被徹換

(... 某國係英國,唔係中國,咪搞錯。)

818 維園非法集結案未開始審就已經爆出大粒咁大單花生。

案件牽涉多位「老泛民」人物,包括黎智英、李柱銘、李卓人、何俊仁等等。香港政府聘請英國御用大狀 David Perry 代表控方。據報[1],英國政界普遍質疑 Perry 接官司有違道德。英國外相出聲[2]話 Perry 本身冇必要接官司,而家俾人覺得佢「唯利是圖 (mercenary)」。

既然外交部都已經出咗聲,唔通真係等俾人告 treason 先肯收手?Perry 唯有同香港政府講,#功成不必在我。[3] 香港律政司另聘律師[4]。

其實 97 後香港雖然唔再係大英帝國一部份,但香港仍然係普通法地區,政府都不時聘請英國大狀作顧問同打官司。例如早前「暗角七警案」政府都聘用英國御用大狀,所以今次 818 非法集結案搵英國律師都可以話只係「例行公事」。而 Perry 本身都喺多單案件[5]次代表香港政府,包括許仕仁案、陳振聰案等等。大狀受制於 "cab rank rule",即係好似的士站嘅的士咁,唔可以拒絕唔接case,所以理論上 Perry 係冇得話唔接呢單案嘅。[6]

咁點解 Perry 今次出事呢? 咪就係「政治敏感度不足」囉。《國安法》實施之後,香港特別行政區已經唔係任由外國勢力活動嘅地方。《國安法》除咗用嚟對付「港獨」分子,更加係禁絕外國人員喺香港進行任何對中國不利嘅活動。另外,本身同英國 friend 過夾 band 嘅香港政府,而家要公務員宣誓效忠中華人民共和國香港特別行政區。喺外國政權眼中,今時今日嘅香港,已經係等同中國一樣嘅對峙政權。喺咁嘅背景之下,英國嘅御用律師幫香港政府去控告一啲英國公民,已經有種「叛國」意味[7]。

英國律師私人業務變成「外交」問題,要由外交部出手干涉,講到底都係國家利益。喺國家利益之下,法治大國都會俾政治壓力叫律師唔好接官司,你又點可以隨便話 #法治已死[8] 呢?

另一邊廂,據聞英國已經激烈辯論緊究竟仲派唔派退休法官當香港終審法院非常任法官。David Perry 事件可能係英國政府呢件事嘅一種啟示。

----

[1] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/13/hong-kong-hires-british-qc-to-prosecute-pro-democracy-activists
[2] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/17/dominic-raab-calls-qc-acting-for-hong-kong-government-mercenary
[3] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/20/david-perry-qc-quits-prosecution-of-hong-kong-activists
[4] https://www.doj.gov.hk/en/community_engagement/press/20210120_pr1.html
[5] https://www.hklii.org/cgi-bin/sinosrch.cgi?meta=%2Fhklii&method=auto&mask_path=&mask_world=&query=%22Perry+QC%22&results=50&submit=Search+%2F+%E6%90%9C%E5%B0%8B&rank=on&callback=off&legisopt=&view=relevance&max=  似乎 "Re Perry" 案係聘用外國律師嘅重要先例嚟,唔知係咪佢「鍾意代表香港政府」太出名所以英國搵咗佢嚟開刀⋯
[6] 事實係點?你未試過喺的士站俾人拒載咩?少年你太年輕了⋯ (有說外國案件唔計,但問題係 Perry 已經喺香港打咗好多case,係咪作為律司佢每單案都要做政治判斷呢?)

[7] 當然中英兩國仍然係和平,表面友好,所以行為遠遠未至於「叛國」,但只係程度問題
[8] 我不嬲話,「法治」本身就係咁,香港人對法律嘅想像,大概應該叫「發夢」

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