Skip to main content

扮女同志呃蝦條犯唔犯法?

 「扮女同志」比較似「呃蝦條」多過似「強姦」。馬後炮咁講,如果呢單案唔係告「強姦」而係「呃蝦條」,入罪機會可能會高啲。喺香港「呃蝦條」係犯法嘅,罪名係「以虛假藉口促致他人作非法的性行為」(Crimes Ordinance s120 "Procurement by false pretences")。呢條罪嘅條文用字有啲怪,斷估本身係用嚟阻止迫良為娼之類嘅犯罪行為。

不過偉大嘅香港特區律政司發現啲條文可以用嚟告人「呃蝦條」。當年嘅「性交轉運案」就係用呢條 s120 嚟告。

喺我眼中,「性交轉運案」有一大堆法理問題,包括條文寫到一嚿屎咁,字面解讀似乎係違心講句「I love you」嚟呃蝦條都會入到罪;另外就係明明香港喺基本法下有宗教自由,但法庭就好隨意咁批判民間嘅迷信。呢樣嘢我每隔一兩年就會「年經」提一次,因為真係講唔撚過去 (不過你提呢啲嘢,唔通你支持性交轉運呃蝦條?會俾人人格謀殺架)。

今次俾我留意到原來有 Cornell 學者寫咗篇文詳細探討,所以唔係我講架,美帝大學學者講架。

link: https://ww3.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/ILJ/upload/Chen-final.pdf



Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Trump v. CASA, Inc. et al.

The recent Trump case was one of the most eye-opening and confusing judgments I've read. For context, Trump signed an executive order to re-interpret "birthright" citizenship limiting it to children born in USA by at least one parent with US citizenship. A couple district courts ordered preliminary injunctions against its enforcement. The government eventually argued to the Supreme Court that the preliminary injunctions were too broad in scope. The court with an apparently 6:3 majority decided that the lower courts had no right to award "universal injunctions" beyond the scope of the plaintiffs seeking the injunction. Federal courts' power to issue injunctions apparently stems from the Judiciary Act of 1789, which endowed federal courts with jurisdiction over "all suits... in equity". This is nothing exciting, except that the USSC then declares that the scope of "equity" is basically the jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery in Engla...

Reconciling apparent inconsistencies within the Basic Law -- what is the proper approach?

What happens when two different pieces of legislation contradict each other? In common law, one could apply the principle of "implied repeal", where the subsequent legislation would be considered to have repealed the earlier one. But the Basic Law has not undergone amendments since its promulgation in 1990, so this does not apply. Another common way to resolve apparent contradictions is to consider that the more general provision be qualified by the more specific one. Yet in cases where fundamental rights are at issue, courts may instead adopt a " generous interpretation ", restricting the scope of those provisions that appear to restrict fundamental rights. Indeed, this was the approach laid out by the Court of Final Appeal in 1999 in Ng Ka Ling : The courts should give a generous interpretation to the provisions in Chapter III that contain these constitutional guarantees in order to give to Hong Kong residents the full measure of fundamental rights and freedoms so...