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以超越 Boolean Logic 嘅邏輯解讀黎智英保釋案

黎智英保釋案終極上訴結果出爐。結果唔意外,又係政府勝訴。

其實冇咩特別好講,不過見到蕭雲轉述「一位法律界朋友」嘅評論[1],批評 CFA 否定原審法官嘅「負負得正」推論,我就真係要講返兩句以正視聽。

保釋申請係一個控辯雙方都未有機會向法庭提供十足證據嘅情況下進行。任何關於案情嘅問題(例如「疑犯保釋其間會唔會再犯?」),法庭通常未能夠作出非黑即白嘅判斷,只能夠有一個好模糊嘅主觀印像。呢個係保釋程序嘅根本限制嚟。相對地,入門邏輯學教嘅 Boolean Logic 就係假設所有嘢一係 true 一係 false,喺保釋申請嗰度應用,就會論推出錯誤結果。

事實上,如果要 model 呢種情況,更適合嘅邏輯系統係 Ternary Logic [2] 或者 Fuzzy Logic[3],兩者都唔會推論出原審法官嘅所謂「負負得正」結論。

當然,《國安法》寫明「除非法官有充足理由相信其不會繼續實施危害國家安全行為」,本身係屈機嘅。如果分「會繼續犯」、「唔會繼續犯」、「唔肯定」三種狀況嘅話,咁只有「唔會繼續犯」先可以保釋,「唔肯定」係唔得嘅。  而喺香港過往喺普通法同 CPO 9G 嘅做法係「唔肯定」通常都 OK。

問心嗰句,CFA 呢個結論先至係「正常」解讀方法。普通法法庭當然有各種手段夾硬解讀成另外意思,CFI 就係例子。不過咁做已經係明顯「刻意抗拒」國安法。人大法工委一年前嘅警告言猶在耳[4],究竟香港啲「法律界朋友」係咪真係咁想攬炒,挑動中港雙方司法大亂鬥呢?情感、政治嘅嘢就話好主觀,好似梁振英同志話齋,Let's be real,你哋在座各位都收過肥佬黎錢[5],撐佢係人之常情。但喺法理上,真係冇任何理性論據去支持佢哋對國安法嗰種嘅另類解讀。


[1] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1894690557336547&id=100003868649005
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuzzy_logic
[4] http://www.xinhuanet.com/legal/2019-11/19/c_1125246732.htm
[5] 利申:我冇,一蚊都冇,亦都冇俾過錢佢


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