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女人嘅青春值幾錢?如果係都要將呢段日子加上價錢碼,我希望係⋯⋯

喺普通法要湊成一份合約,要啲咩條件? 教科書話,要有 agreement between two parties, 要有足夠嘅 certainty,要有 consideration,要有 intention to create legal relations,之類。

YU MAN FUNG ALICE (于文鳳) v CHIAU SING CHI STEPHEN (周星馳) [2020] HKCFI 2923

呢個 case 主要爭論就係關於某口頭協議有冇 intention to create legal relations。如果唔記得咗相關嘅法律原則,判詞有幾段寫得好清楚。

然後,進入花生部份喇!

學連登仔話齋,所有男女問題都係「勞資糾紛」,咁呢單案又係點玩法呢?

原告人于文鳳 1997/98 年開始同周星馳拍拖,2002 辭埋職,幫周打理啲投資嘢。周會每個月俾「人工」于,一開始每月 $20,000,之後 $43,000,最後係 $59,000。呢筆錢基本上冇乜爭拗。

另外,于做周星馳女朋友嘅時候,有口頭協議可以得到佢買賣物業嘅 10% 利潤。最後,基於種種對原告不利嘅因素,法官認為原告未能證明兩日作出呢個口頭協議時有意圖形成法律關係,所以周星馳俾于文鳳嘅錢,都係情侶之間嘅「禮物」。

咁,做周星馳女朋友可以「賺」到幾多錢?


前前後後都 cap 咗兩千萬。

最後鬧分手嘅時候,于係咁申索其他物業嘅利潤。周怕咗于,周再俾咗一千萬「分手費」。

計埋之前嘅「月薪」,周前後俾咗三千幾萬俾于。

一開始于同周拍拖嗰陣,于仲未辭職,但都會花時間幫周打理物業投資嘅嘢。一開始完全係任勞任怨,冇任何回報嘅。去到 2002 年,全職幫周,都只係收 $20000。當時于嘅哥哥都忍唔住問:「你係咪會同周結婚?唔係花咁多時間有咩回報?」講到呢度,我不禁感嘆愛情嘅偉大⋯⋯起碼一開始係咁。但係,隨住年月過去,于向周攞嘅錢越嚟越多,根據法官覆述案情,「分手」係于大約喺 2010 年提出嘅,當時佢有個新男朋友。分手後,于向周索取幾千萬嘅「佣金」。愛不夠,唯有用錢去填補。但去到最後,完全冇愛嘅時候,用幾多錢都填補唔到。

女人嘅青春值幾錢?如果係都要將呢段日子加上價錢碼,我希望係⋯⋯



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btw, 原告人嘅大狀竟然係前律政司司長⋯ 吖睇嚟佢返返去 private practice 都撈得唔錯喎。



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