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勤力的士司機月入三萬,但原來大部份人都會蛇王!

(LEE CHIT MING v. MAN SIU HUNG [2017] HKCFI 442)

香港嘅的士司機賺幾多錢?拒客係咪會賺多啲?的士司機有冇蛇王?「佔中」嗰陣係咪賺少咗?

呢度全部都有答案!

2017年高等法院有單交通意外案件,有人撞傷咗的士司機(原告),原告喺庭上證明自己收入,用嚟計賠償金額。

亮點s:

1. 案中司機大約每日賺 $1000,一個月賺三萬

2. 呢個數比其他公開數據多起碼一倍

3. 案中司機認為,其他人賺得咁少係因為 #拒客 同 #蛇王!!! [見31段]

4. 班仆街果然係唔撚交稅  [42段]

4. 班仆街果然係唔撚交稅 

4. 班仆街果然係唔撚交稅 

4. 班仆街果然係唔撚交稅 

5. 「佔中」十月嗰排,生意少咗大約 15% 左右 [86段、Annex 2]

(大部份資料都係 24-41 段搵到,另外最底有晒成個表。案中司機嘅數據似乎都好可信,有多方面嘅佐證。)


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