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DQ4 宣誓案

SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE v. NATHAN LAW KWUN CHUNG [2017] 4 HKLRD 115

(其一)

睇緊判詞,區官今次將人大釋法嘅內容發揮得淋漓盡致呀~ <3

未睇晒內容,不過睇到呢度想講幾句。羅冠聰在宣誓前後嘅舉動,被法官判斷為「令人客觀地覺得佢嘅宣誓只係極權迫害下而做嘅」,並非真誠宣誓。

如果一個人宣誓前後嘅舉動可以用嚟判斷宣誓唔真心,咁佢平時嘅舉動一樣都可以,就正如舊年七月幾個選舉主任,都係根據參選人平日嘅言論判斷佢哋唔會真誠擁護基本法。

咁樣意味住,下一屆選舉,任何被政府認為唔真心擁護基本法嘅議員,都隨時會被入稟要求法庭 DQ,甚至立法會監誓者判斷宣誓無效。

呢啲嘢全部都有法律根據,並且係政府同監誓者嘅「憲制責任」。除非呢啲講法被上訴庭駁回,否則大家否定呢啲憲制責任的話,話唔定都算係唔真誠擁護基本法架。

大家睇路,基本大法好~ <3

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PS: 喺民事訴訟裡面,證據只需要 on balance of probabilities,即係 more likely than not。唔知 DQ 呢啲重大案件係咪會嚴啲,不過暫時嚟睇,理論上宣誓時只要政府同法院斷估某某唔真誠,就 DQ 得架喇。大家記住唔好瓜田李下呀~~~~ 講明係 objective test 唔係 subjective test 嚟架~~


(其二)

區官份判詞裡面,提及 "objectively" 71 次,提及 "objective" 43 次。客觀嚟講,佢真係提好多次呢個詞語,應該都可以客觀地判斷為判辭嘅其中一個重點。(相比起 "it" 大約用咗 145 次,"law" 用咗 179 次)

近年我對「客觀」嘅理解精進咗好多,所謂「客觀」就係「我覺得係咁,你睇,阿邊個邊個佢哋都同意啦」。

「客觀」嘅標準,喺 DQ 立法會議員嘅情況下,即係賦予法庭(及政府)一個手段去無視被 DQ 議員嘅自陳表述。只要法庭「客觀地」認為某議員唔真誠宣誓,咁無論佢講乜都冇用。事實上,今次判決已經用咗呢招嚟否定某些議員對案情嘅解釋。

「唔真誠宣誓」絕對唔限於疑似搞港獨嘅情況。中共一直都批評某些泛民主派議員「唔愛國」。究竟在「客觀」嘅角度之下,一班被中共標籤為「唔愛國」嘅人士,係咪真誠宣誓效忠中華人民共和國香港特別行政區呢?我真係唔知,不過我客觀地睇,任何結論都唔係冇可能架。

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至於個 objective test 點樣嚟,貌似係區官 quote 返梁游案嘅判詞。梁游案中,CFI 判詞用咗 "objective" 18 次左右。 CA 判詞提過一次。

(其三)

好多人話,今日法院 DQ 多四個,點解仲未暴動?

好簡單,因為香港係法治社會囉。點解法治係咁重要?你而家就明白。否則,一暴動起上嚟,幾百間國際企業損失慘重,會動搖香港作為國際金融中心嘅地位。

好多人話,呢種判決結果係「rule by law」唔係「rule of law」。究竟邊度違反「法治」精神?法治精神就係政府要跟法律行事,而法庭要公平公正咁跟據法律判案。而家完全冇違反法治精神嘅判決,你最多話係違反民主精神。

點解違反民主精神?因為在《基本法》之下,統一國家比民主精神更重要。我唔認為「法治」必然包括民主,但如果閣下認為「法治」必須包含民主精神,咁你必須承認香港從來都未曾有過法治。

將「法治」嘅定義當係龍門咁搬係冇用嘅,因為事實就係事實。面對事實,認識《基本法》,認識香港法治制度,係作為香港公民必須嘅責任。

所以,香港必須要進行更多公民教育,教學生正確認識《基本法》。

(其四)

繼續睇判詞,繼續講。

宣誓後,劉小麗喺臉書解釋自己點解花十分鐘拖長嚟讀誓詞:「昨天,我將官方誓詞逐字宣讀。誓詞變成九十多句毫無連貫性的句子,沒有任何組合、連結及意義,令聽眾無法聽到任何句式及語氣」呢啲解釋被區官接受為印證劉小麗冇真誠宣讀誓詞嘅證據。

後來,劉小麗因 DQ 案,向法庭解釋點解會每字停頓六秒,大概係話自己因語言學上嘅興趣,所以要指出其他人宣誓嘅虛偽乜乜柒柒。區官唔接受劉小麗呢啲解釋,話只係當事人「主觀」嘅解釋,與案情所需嘅「客觀」解釋無關。

當然,我同意就算劉小麗宣誓後冇「解釋」自己嘅行為,本身佢宣誓嘅行動已經好明顯唔係真誠莊嚴。但點解法庭會接受不利於劉嘅自述,而唔接受有利於劉嘅自述呢?兩個都係主觀嘅,不過區官就只接受前者,我真係唔明白。

如果係普通案件,我就會評論話法官對被告有某種偏見,所以不一致地應用法律,以得出某種結論。(法律學者分析案例時,在非正式場合都會講下呢種事係的確會發生。)不過既然呢單案事關重大,區官係一時被自己偏見蒙蔽,定係刻意製造先例,向大家傳達「在基本法 104 條之下,解釋即係掩飾」嘅意思,我就唔知喇。

(其五)

根據今日嘅判詞,只要刻意地唔跟足規定做,就唔算有效宣誓。(當然仲有其他原因可以 DQ 你,包括港獨乜乜乜⋯)

方潤嘅講法係,法庭應該先睇下宣誓加料有冇政治不正確嘅內容,冇觸犯中共底線嘅就應該可以過到骨。

我覺得相比之下,法庭嗰個判決比較合乎法治精神,唔知方潤係咪覺得中國人地方嘅法庭應該講多啲人治同政治啦。

喺中國人嘅地方(包括香港),好多外國價值都會變質。大把人口頭講法治,但一旦涉及自己立場嘅嘢,乜鬼原則都抛諸腦後了。如果中共唔講原則,香港所謂泛民主派及其支持者,更加唔講原則。有謂「輸打贏要」,莫過於是。



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