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司法覆核嘅自由時代終結

(KWOK WING HANG AND OTHERS v. CHIEF EXECUTIVE IN COUNCIL AND ANOTHER [2020] HKCA 192)

上訴庭話判斷《禁止蒙面規例》合唔合憲要考慮 "continuity"，拎返六十幾年前嘅港英案例出嚟合理化判決，雖然否定咗之前人大法工委嘅講法，重申法院有權審核香港法例是否違憲，不過客觀結果就係：港英時期合憲嘅嘢，而家唔可以輕易話佢違憲，除非 97 後嘅憲制安排同 97 前有好大分別 *。再加上上訴庭話《基本法》係「活的憲法」所以唔可以永遠停留喺 97 年人大決定，咁即係話如果你想覆核嘅話，唔該講返你個情況同 97 年嗰陣有咩分別先，解釋點解有必要改動人大常委決定，否則就係挑戰人大常委權力。

當然蒙面規例案件應該仲未完，照計會繼續上 CFA 度，不過如果照上訴庭嘅判詞嚟睇，法庭隨心所欲覆核香港法例違憲嘅快樂日子已經算係完結咗。

*: 如果 195X 年香港立法局同 2019 年香港立法會喺上訴庭眼中都係差唔多，舊案例嘅原則仲可以照樣應用嘅話，我都諗唔到點樣先算係好大分別要 break 到 continuity :0)

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Update @2020 Nov - tl;dr - 上訴庭跪咗，「好彩」人大常委似乎收貨冇再追殺落去。(本老師都有出力幫各方分析架。)

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