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香港法院無權裁定法律是否違憲?

(人大法工委話香港法院無權審查香港法律是否違反基本法)

本身呢排唔想講太多法律嘅細節嘢,但今日呢單真係夠晒爆。

從法理上嚟講,其實人大法工委嘅講法係經得起推敲嘅。「1997年人大常委已經檢視並決定香港法例符合基本法」的確係事實嚟。當時,少量違反《基本法》嘅英殖時代法例都同時被廢除。喺咁嘅觀點下,香港法庭貿然同人大常委唱反調,話人大常委已批閱嘅法例違反《基本法》,當然係越權。

但係,香港終審法院一早喺 Ng Ka Ling 案清楚表明法庭有權,亦有負任,去判定法例係咪符合《基本法》:

// In exercising their judicial power conferred by the Basic Law, the courts of the Region have a duty to enforce and interpret that Law. They undoubtedly have the jurisdiction to examine whether legislation enacted by the legislature of the Region or acts of the executive authorities of the Region are consistent with the Basic Law and, if found to be inconsistent, to hold them to be invalid. The exercise of this jurisdiction is a matter of obligation, not of discretion so that if inconsistency is established, the courts are bound to hold that a law or executive act is invalid at least to the extent of the inconsistency. Although this has not been questioned, it is right that we should take this opportunity of stating it unequivocally. In exercising this jurisdiction, the courts perform their constitutional role under the Basic Law of acting as a constitutional check on the executive and legislative branches of government to ensure that they act in accordance with the Basic Law. //

呢個判決引發人大常委第一次釋法。釋法內容係澄清返基本法 24 條關於香港居民身份嘅問題,但對於香港法庭有冇權判斷法例不符基本法嘅問題,就冇作出評論。

最有趣嘅係,終審法院喺釋法之後,破天荒出多咗份判詞,內容基本上係認契弟,話終審法院無權挑戰人大常委決定。

// The Court's judgment on 29 January 1999 did not question the authority of the Standing Committee to make an interpretation under Article 158 which would have to be followed by the courts of the Region. The Court accepts that it cannot question that authority. Nor did the Court's judgment question, and the Court accepts that it cannot question, the authority of the National People's Congress or the Standing Committee to do any act which is in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law and the procedure therein. //

但喺 Ng Ka Ling 案之後,香港法庭一直自認有權去審視法例,決定係咪違憲。例如 Leung Kwok Hung [1] 案,終審庭就判斷《公安條例》違憲。

呢樣嘢,香港法律學生嘅教科書寫得好清楚,十幾廿年前(甚至更早期)已經被當成金科玉律。點解中央政府咁多年都冇出過聲?

我唔係中央政府心裡面條蟲,我當然唔知。又或者佢哋喺啲法律交流會度嘈過但冇人理。但係,睇返 Leung Kwok Hung 案,佢係幾神奇嘅案例,整個判決都圍繞 "ordre public" 同 "public order" 嘅字眼上嘅分別,咁多年嚟我都睇唔明,唔知係咪李國能明知會俾人屌,所以特登擦邊球,側側膊。後來,法庭雖然都偶有宣告法例不符基本法嘅案例,但我搵到嘅,都只係啲「無關痛癢」嘅程序嘢 [2]。

今次嘅判決,喺最非常嘅時期,法庭廢咗特區政府嘅武功,如果內地學者原來一直都對呢個觀點不滿但穩而不發,都難怪咁突然咁爆出嚟。

不過講開又講,其實內地觀點唔係完全冇漏洞嘅。香港法律沿用英殖時代嘅普通法,亦係基於《基本法》第八條。如果喺 1997 年 6 月 30 日,某啲法例已經無效,咁喺 1997 年 7 月 1 日之後都固然係繼續無效。點解喺6月30日會無效呢?因為《香港人權法案》。普通法裡面有樣嘢叫做implied repeal[3]嘅概念,尤其適用於關於人權嘅法律。懶得翻譯做中文,直接引維基啦:

// The doctrine of implied repeal is a concept in constitutional theory which states that where an Act of Parliament or an Act of Congress (or of some other legislature) conflicts with an earlier one, the later Act takes precedence and the conflicting parts of the earlier Act become legally inoperable. This doctrine is expressed in the Latin phrase "leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant". //

喺 implied repeal 嘅運作下,如果《緊急法》確實違反《香港人權法案條例》,咁佢喺 1992 年,基於普通法嘅運作,已經失效。去到 1997 年 7 月 1 日,喺《基本法》第8條嘅操作下,仍然係無效。**咁之但係呢**,今次「蒙臉法」嘅司法覆核案嘅判詞裡面,法庭清楚講明《緊急法》冇直接違反《香港人權法案條例》 :) 當然,咁唔代表其他香港法例冇違反《香港人權法案條例》。如果我哋接受人大法工委嘅觀點,咁嗰啲法例點樣處理,就真係一個謎。

今年讀 "constitutional law" 嘅同學,究竟你哋考試嗰陣要答啲乜呢?我真係恭喜你哋呀 :0) 尤其係梁美芬啲學生,我真係好想知佢平時教啲乜⋯

[1] Leung Kwok Hung & Others v. HKSAR [2005] HKCFA 41

[2] 例如 Mok Charles v Tam Wai Ho (2010) 13 HKCFAR 762

[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Implied_repeal


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