Skip to main content

評論曾蔭權案 -- 又到咗我抹黑 ICAC 嘅環節

(HKSAR v. TSANG YAM-KUEN, DONALD (曾蔭權) [2019] HKCFA 24)

最近冇咩時間睇八卦嘢,不過今日搭車都隨便𥅈咗一下曾蔭權案嘅判詞。

曾蔭權曾經係香港最高官員,案件本身有深遠嘅政治意義。第一,確立咗特首卸任之後係可以俾人告嘅[1],第二就係由終審法院再次確認「公職人員行為失當」裡面關於「有意隱瞞」嘅定義。

我唔知大眾對於官員利益申報嘅要求有幾嚴格啦,我本人就覺得呢啲規矩雖然係必須,但亦都係好L麻煩嘅。報漏、或者唔為意有利益衝突、或者對規矩嘅理解有誤,都會搞到申報少咗嘢。我唔係為公職人員「開脫」,純粹覺得,一般大眾如果身處同一個位置,都好可能會報漏嘢嘅。

「公職人員行為失當」係普通法罪行,冇法律條文清楚寫明定義,而係靠案例去定義。如果要我簡單解釋,就係「公職人員犯咗嚴重嘅錯而冇合理辯解」。至於點樣先算「行為失當」,幾「嚴重」先算嚴重,乜嘢先算係「合理辯解」?冇人知。全部都係等審訊嘅時候,由法官指示陪審員去判定。(如果係區院審就係法官兼任陪審員一個人說了算。)

所以如果 ICAC 真係認真要追查到底,我相信都唔少卸任嘅高官會被人查到啲「可能」「犯法」嘢出嚟。尤其係當「公職人員行為失當」定義闊過大西洋,任何 ICAC 搵到嘅灰色嘢都可以「有合理機會達致定罪」。就算好似今次咁樣,最後告唔入,佢都可以搞到你驚足七年,一個上訴失敗隨時仲要坐監。

以我理解,ICAC 除咗處理「正常」貪污案件之外,亦有政治檢控嘅角色。由於公眾對貪污相關嘅法律未必太認識,大部份被告又係高高在上嘅人物,公眾未必切身理解指控,所以面對帶有政治色彩嘅檢控,被告好少得到大眾嘅同情。佢哋大多數都只能夠「啞巴吃黃蓮,有苦說不得」。如果有人企出嚟反對 ICAC,豈不是反對廉潔社會,支持貪腐?

(順帶一提:好多人話習大大借打貪去鞏固自己政治地位,但其實呢啲橋唔怕舊,英國人幾十年前已經喺香港做過了。)

上到終審法院 high profile 嘅所謂「貪腐」案,我印像最深刻嘅仍然係陳志雲案。相信公眾嘅印像係陳係被控「貪污」,但其實講到尾佢只係接咗一單同公司生意有關嘅外快,客觀嚟講又唔多似損害咗公司利益。或者佢咁做真係(曾經)犯法[2],但當時律政司不滿原審法官多次「放生」陳,不斷上訴,為嘅只係執行一個 "victimless crime" 嘅「公義」,值唔值得呢?(最起碼佢哋玩法律遊戲不斷上訴又上訴,隨時用咗幾千萬公帑⋯)

究竟當時 ICAC 為乜要咁做?我一直都認為,今時今日 TVB 變成 "CCTVB",呢單案件都有一定嘅作用。

ICAC 同律政司起訴曾蔭權,係純粹法律考慮,定係有政治成份架呢?要知道,#愛就係選擇,香港幾百萬人每日都有人犯法,點解要查呢一個人,而唔查嗰個,一定要有取捨。呢個取捨絕對唔只係「法律」考慮,亦有部門內部行政效率嘅考慮,調查員亦要作出判斷究竟乜案件比較嚴重、證據比較充足等等。至於有冇政治考慮,我諗只有佢哋自己知。

不過既然案件嘅審訊係公開嘅,大家有眼得睇,究竟 ICAC 係做緊咩工作。一個特首申報漏少少利益,被 ICAC 打到幾乎不得善終;另一個特首有單五千萬嘅交易,公眾唔知有冇問題,外國嘅調查被政治力量壓住唔查,而香港 ICAC 亦都唔檢控。

一般公眾如我,固然係唔知內情,如果我有更充足嘅資料,我可能都會同意佢哋嘅決定都唔定,不過作為局外人,我只能夠推斷後者係「政治不檢控」。如是者,相比之下,前者就只能夠係政治檢控。

唔知香港反政府嘅政治犯,對於曾老前輩加入行例,會否有 #恥與為伍 嘅感覺呢?我自己就覺得,社會不公義就係不公義,冇咩階級或政見之分。

----
[1] 在任嗰陣*可能*有 immunity,而基於政治現實,就算證據充足,在任嘅時候都未必真係會告。
[2] 有評論指終審法院為陳志雲案改變防止賄賂條例條文定義 (《終審庭改寫防賄條例》 劉進圖 明報2017年3月14日)


Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Trump v. CASA, Inc. et al.

The recent Trump case was one of the most eye-opening and confusing judgments I've read. For context, Trump signed an executive order to re-interpret "birthright" citizenship limiting it to children born in USA by at least one parent with US citizenship. A couple district courts ordered preliminary injunctions against its enforcement. The government eventually argued to the Supreme Court that the preliminary injunctions were too broad in scope. The court with an apparently 6:3 majority decided that the lower courts had no right to award "universal injunctions" beyond the scope of the plaintiffs seeking the injunction. Federal courts' power to issue injunctions apparently stems from the Judiciary Act of 1789, which endowed federal courts with jurisdiction over "all suits... in equity". This is nothing exciting, except that the USSC then declares that the scope of "equity" is basically the jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery in Engla...

Reconciling apparent inconsistencies within the Basic Law -- what is the proper approach?

What happens when two different pieces of legislation contradict each other? In common law, one could apply the principle of "implied repeal", where the subsequent legislation would be considered to have repealed the earlier one. But the Basic Law has not undergone amendments since its promulgation in 1990, so this does not apply. Another common way to resolve apparent contradictions is to consider that the more general provision be qualified by the more specific one. Yet in cases where fundamental rights are at issue, courts may instead adopt a " generous interpretation ", restricting the scope of those provisions that appear to restrict fundamental rights. Indeed, this was the approach laid out by the Court of Final Appeal in 1999 in Ng Ka Ling : The courts should give a generous interpretation to the provisions in Chapter III that contain these constitutional guarantees in order to give to Hong Kong residents the full measure of fundamental rights and freedoms so...