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邊個話《基本法》係憲法嚟?

好多人話「憲法係限制政府、保障人民權利」。我諗呢句說話放諸四海大致上係啱嘅。不過邊個話《基本法》係憲法嚟?

好多人都唔知其實《基本法》係中華人民共和國嘅全國性法律。呢樣嘢係無可置疑嘅事實。爭議只在於究竟我哋可否將呢條全國性法律「當成」憲法。喺香港嘅法制嚟講,香港法律、政府嘅決定、法院嘅判決都不得違反《基本法》,否則無效。呢方面《基本法》嘅運作的確同外國嘅憲法機制好相似。

但某啲方面似,就係咪代表所有嘢都必然相似呢?未必架喎。你大可以引用好多香港學者、律師,佢哋普遍認為《基本法》係香港嘅「小憲法」。不過呢種講法,中共係唔承認嘅。早幾年《人民日報》就出咗篇文大大力屌人將《基本法》同憲法混淆,話會引致實然港獨[1]。

我就對呢啲爭議冇咩感覺,畢竟爭論定義好無謂。不過我想指出,如果你想引用「憲法係限制政府、保障人民權利」呢種講法去證明「市民不可能違反《基本法》」,首先要審視前設有冇錯。你當然可以話《基本法》真係憲法嚟,但如果對方唔認同呢個前設,後面啲嘢都只會係廢話。

唔係話廢話唔講得,世界上有種邏輯謬誤叫做「你仲有冇打老婆呀?」[2] 呢種講法作為詭辯技巧係唔錯嘅,係可以呃到下人嘅。不過詭辯呢家嘢,白痴公眾信咗唔緊要,自己咪撚信埋一份吖嘛。

《基本法》係中共對香港特區嘅一個枷鎖。政府不斷話要跟《基本法》辦事,其實就係「我好聽話架!」嘅黨八股嚟。香港特區唔需要「始終不渝地遵循黨嘅指示」,所以「堅決謹守基本法」就係「一國兩制」之下嘅代替品。

呢啲係政治現實嚟。中共係咁講要跟《基本法》辦事,唔通真係好關心香港人嘅人權自由咩?(我唔係話佢哋要打壓呀,只係 WFC 咋~) 佢哋關心嘅係香港特區政府聽唔聽話[3],有冇勾結外國勢力[4],有冇心思思想將「高度自治」提升做「自治」,有冇包藏港獨思想[5],有冇好好實踐「一國」嘅方針。

擁有呢種功能嘅《基本法》係咪大家認知嘅「憲法」嚟?「限制政府」嗰 part 係啱呀,不過條狗繩喺中共手中。香港特區政府嘅限制,係以中華人民共和國嘅利益為基礎而設立嘅。喺呢啲限制之下,香港人民係咪真係得益呢? 人民權利係咪真係受保障呢? 如果你覺得係,咁《基本法》咪係憲法嚟囉~~ (咁深嘅問題我就唔識答喇)

我就覺得呢,將《基本法》變成「憲法」呢種所謂「修憲派」嘅思維係有其吸引之處,勝在唔使用腦去創作舊新嘢出嚟嘛。不過如果你真係打算喺《基本法》之中剔走中共對港嘅控制權,將敵人嘅法寶取為己用,你有冇咁嘅能耐先?你總唔可以一邊口頭認同《基本法》,一邊無視人大及人大常委喺《基本法》裡面嘅無上權力,包括佢哋喺修改同解釋《基本法》嘅權力。[6]

喺傳統西方邏輯學上,矛盾嘅嘢,係可以推算出任何歪理,吹到天花龍鳳。但真係,實踐起嚟嗰陣,以子之矛攻子之盾,何如?

[1] http://www.npc.gov.cn/…/xinwen/syxw/…/19/content_1867089.htm
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loaded_question
[3] 第 43 條:特首向對中央人民政府負責; 第 45 條:特首由中央人民政府任命; 第 48 條: 中央人民政府任命下列主要官員
[4] 國防由解放軍負責、外交須得中央批准
[5] 第一條
[6] 其實係有方法叫大人修改《基本法》剔走自己嘅權力嘅,只要港獨分子努力投共,全面控制人大體制⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ 所以,投共港獨係唯一可行出路,不過我估冇人肯咁做架喇。港獨不可行,大家咪撚亂嚟。

PS:講多句。如果真係想用憲法撻人,不妨攞真嗰份出嚟望下。啲人話嗰啲所謂自由只係某張紙上嘅字,但起碼引用嗰啲條文去講嘢,嗌交唔會輸個勢。


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