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泛民律師莫再為基本法塗脂抹粉

有時見到「法律界」啲人亂咁出文鳩噏,為《基本法》塗脂抹粉,真係好撚躁底。

喺普通法制度之下,法官偶然會引用法律學者嘅法律觀點,所以學者嘅評論,係有可能會變成實際法律一部份。不過,當《基本法》寫明解釋權在人大常委,而人大常委根本就唔會理你班普通法律師點樣「分析」條文,你再用返平時嗰種方法去評論《基本法》,根本同 FF 冇分別。

事實上,好多泛民之中所謂法律界人士喺媒體上發表嘅觀點,我懷疑連在普通法律師眼中亦係狗屁不通。雖然某程度上法律就係玩弄語言藝術,但若果先存政治成見,然後再喺法律中尋找最牽強嘅證據去支持自己嘅立場,呢種態度,未免同人大常委嘅做法同出一轍,甚至比人大常委更加離譜。

更嚴重嘅係,一般大眾市民睇完呢啲牽強且 on9 嘅 FF 評論之後,信以為真,以為只係<政府/法庭/中共>因政治原因而「誤解」《基本法》,以為《基本法》本身對香港人權利有足夠保障,只係在「奸人」手中實踐嗰陣出事。

舉個例,《基本法》寫明人大常委擁有最終解釋權,而每次人大釋法,香港法律界嘅反對聲音,只針對人大常委作出解釋嘅決定,而從來冇質疑《基本法》 158 條本身。言下之意,即《基本法》 158 條本身「冇咩問題」,即《基本法》本身值得擁護,只不過係人大常委唔應該釋法而已。呢種態度,本身就好奇怪。如果有法例寫明警察可以隨便打人,你會唔會只鬧警察,而唔去質疑法律本身?

所以,呢啲「小罵大幫忙」嘅評論,變相就係為《基本法》塗脂抹粉。

誠然,《基本法》有好多種唔同方法去解讀,但只要第 158 條寫明釋法權屬於人大常委,任何其他未得人大常委認同嘅解讀,都只不過係無窮嘅幻想而已。當刻香港人最需要做嘅事,就係重新認識《基本法》,認清事實,不作無謂幻想。任何社會運動,都唔應該基於一啲無根無據,甚至係被證實錯誤嘅幻想而進行。認清事實,面對事實,然後逐一迎接挑戰,先可以為香港嘅前途,作出真實嘅貢獻。


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