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所謂法律同公義,其實都係睇光環

SECRETARY FOR JUSTICE v. CHAN CHI WAN STEPHEN [2017] HKCFA 15

(其一)

好多人以為,「法律」只係跟規矩執正嚟做。好多人以為法律條文係「清晰」嘅,以為法庭嘅判決只係一般地應用法律條文。但,其實法律既然係用人類嘅日常語言[1]去定義,就會存在好大闡釋嘅空間,所以佢嘅「可塑性」其實好高,喺某啲情況下,有好多種唔同嘅演譯方法。

事實上,法官判案嘅時候,雖然大部份情況下的確係跟足規矩,但喺某啲「特別情況」之下,佢哋係會將法律嘅「可塑性」發揮得淋璃盡致。

例如早幾日終於完結嘅陳志雲案。呢單案反覆喺法院審完又審,上訴完又上訴,旁人只見到律政司為咗雞毛蒜皮嘅小事大興訴訟。雖然按照正常解讀,陳志雲無疑觸犯防止賄賂條例,但所犯「罪不致此」,按常理律政司亦犯唔著大花公帑控告佢。此案主審官多次用各種方法放過陳,唯在上訴庭「執正嚟做」之下被迫判佢罪名成立,但最後仍然冇判監。早幾日終審法院頒佈判詞,將防止賄賂條例第9條「改寫」[2]。喺制度上,終審庭法官只可以闡釋法律條文,而事實上佢哋判詞中亦只係闡釋法律條文。但係,點解終審庭法官對法律嘅理解,同上訴庭嘅竟然如此南轅北轍?雖然我唔係法官心入面條蟲,但我哋只好推論,終審庭法官為咗「搵方法放陳一馬」,不惜利用法律嘅「可塑性」,將法律條文嘅意思「改寫」,令到陳嘅行為變成無罪。

如果大家多啲留意法庭嘅判詞,就知道同類事件屢見不鮮,我引用陳志雲案亦只不過係純粹貪佢新鮮熱辣,並唔係因為此案有咩特別。通常,當案件涉及一啲政治議題,或者案情非比尋常,又或者法官認為現下法律不足以得出一個「公義」結果,就會比較傾向將法律重新「塑造」,或者用比較特別嘅方式去演譯現有嘅法律文字。有時法官嘅創造力過咗火,而且未能自圓其說,上級法院會糾正。而最有趣之處就係,上級法院嘅法官功力比較深厚,發揮創造力時可以侃侃而談,講到新發明嘅法律觀點係理所當然咁樣,尤其係如果佢係最高級法院,或者敗訴者選擇唔上訴,就冇人可以推翻佢嘅結論。

常言道「官字兩個口」,「警」字都有兩個。舊年初一旺角事件,既然已經在政治上有如是定論,咁法律上佢就「必須」被定性為「暴動」,而且涉嫌參與者亦「必須」有一班人被抓出來祭旗。呢系列嘅案件已經唔係普通案件咁簡單,而係「必須」得到某些結果。

如是者,旺角初一案件嘅結果,喺我心中毫無懸念,「被告如不想令人誤會,便不應一同逃跑」呢類推論只不過係例行公事而已。只要案中「必須」達到某個結果,無論如何荒誕嘅推論都可以使用。如果推論難以服眾,亦只係法官功力未夠,運用法律嘅能力未到家而已。

我唔係話香港嘅法律制度已經被「赤化」云云,事實上英國嘅普通法制度本身亦係有如此嘅「彈性」。(有興趣者可以參考英國法庭如何對付北愛爾蘭獨立份子。) 我喺呢篇文章,只不過想指出,當某些行為未得到普遍社會認可,法律站在「公義」立場不得不隨著社會風氣而調整裁決。所謂「公義」,就係幾百萬香港人普遍認可嘅「公義」,而唔係存在於紙張上嘅死條文所講嘅「公義」。

回望當日「佔領」嘅案件,雖然佔領時亦不時發生暴力事件,起初 926、927、928 時更加係令人擔憂事件會否「破壞社會安寧」,但最後事件受到廣大市民認可,不單未有被定性為暴動,發起人獲輕判,絕大部份參與者更加係無承受任何法律後果。

始終,就算係法律,都講究光環嘅。

天佑香港

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[1] 即英文、中文之類,相對於應用於邏輯分析嘅人工語言
[2] 詳情可參考劉進圖文章《終審庭改寫防賄條例》

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(其二)

法律呢家嘢真係好型棍。我睇完判詞都唔係好知而家個 legal position 係點。

如果冇理解錯,四位法官認為《防止賄賂條例》第9條代理人收受利益去做(或不作出)嘅事,須要有可能侵害主事人嘅利益;而陳兆愷NPJ 就認為第9條冇咁嘅要求,只要冇授權之下收受利益去做(或唔做)同主事人事務有關嘅事即屬違法。其中一個考慮,係當有兩個資格一樣嘅競爭者爭主事人生意,如果代理人收受利益去偏幫其中一個,似乎無任何侵害主事人嘅可能(佢點都要揀一個,揀另一個唔會令佢得益更多),咁但係呢種做法似乎唔係大家公認可接受嘅做法。

但事實上係「兩個資格一樣嘅競爭者」係咪一個純綷學術嘅設例,現事中會唔會發生呢?我真係睇唔透。


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