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如果命運有得揀,又邊會有人想犯法?

最近有單新聞,話品學兼優少女賣翻版手機殼罪成候刑。十幾歲女學生屋企靠綜緩生活,我見猶憐,令人反思香港執法機關以至律政司處事係咪太過不近人情。

當然毒果新聞渲染成風不在話下,但令我耿耿於懷嘅從來都係犯案者本身值得可憐之處。如果命運有得揀,冇人會願意犯法而被判罪。本身被審判嘅人都係社會上嘅弱者,就算權貴下獄,都係佢失勢嘅時候。當年讀刑法,略讀過好多殺人放火嘅案件。每一個人犯法,都有其可憐之處,就算係殺人放火,好多時都係佢一時鬼迷心竅導致,又或者佢反社會人格,不過天生有性格缺陷又有得揀架咩。當年每讀到 mens rea (「犯罪意識」,又或者可譯做「惡念」)嘅概念,就覺得周身唔自在,究竟法律憑咩去話一個人心存惡念,所以理應受罰?撫心自問如果自己身處罪犯同樣嘅情境,我會唔會以身試法,真係好難講。普通法講 mens rea,話係懲罰奸惡。但究竟我哋係定係懲罰定係不幸嘅人,我真係唔知。我唔係唔相信自由意志,唔係唔相信人要為自己嘅行為負責,但人總有意志薄弱嘅時候,總有不能自控嘅時候,例如大家慣咗上臉書,未必可以輕易控制自己唔用臉書一樣。

講得有啲遠,總之罪犯之流,大多數都係草根出身,背後多悲情故事,點止係一個所謂品學兼優嘅女學生。愛就係選擇,選擇就係捨棄。一個女學生賣賣翻版手機殼搞到要打官司留案底固然可憐,但每日喺法院出出入入嘅人,大部份都有佢哋嘅苦衷,有佢哋嘅故事,有佢哋嘅無奈。

然而,一個所謂先進社會嘅齒輪,一個以法治為本嘅社會,就係要將呢啲扣人心弦嘅人情,逐一磨蝕。正義女神蒙住眼作出審判,本身就帶有幾分不近人情嘅意味。我哋只可以慨嘆點解個社會變成噉,但難道你又肯喺法律入面明文寫住「品學兼優嘅女學生初犯小過失唔准起訴」咩?到最後,大家都只會猶疑,但又唔肯放棄法治,放棄「法律面前人人平等」嘅假象。所以嘈完幾句,發泄完之後,大家都無奈地好似女神噉樣,閉起雙眼,冇眼睇。


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